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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/04/2006 Accident number: 94 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 01/06/1997 
Where it occurred: Qala Muslim Village, 
Ward 7, Kabul city 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: hard 
rocks/stones 
Date record created: 24/01/2004 Date  last modified: 24/01/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
 
1 
Accident report 
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available. The following summarises its content.  
The victim had been a deminer for 15 months. It was five months since he last attended a 
revision course and 45 days since his last leave. The area where the accident occurred was 
described as a hard hillside. A photograph showed uneven ground and many rocks.  
The investigators determined that the victim was working in an area with barbed wire 
obstacles (that should have been cut and removed). After going around the wire and 
detecting again he got a reading. He did not mark the reading but squatted and started to 
prod with his bayonet, and detonated the mine (which was identified as a PMN from "found 
fragments".  
The victim's visor and bayonet were damaged. A photograph showed the bayonet bent 
(curved) and the visor intact. 
The team Sub-Commander said the victim used excessive force while prodding so was not 
working properly. 
The victim's partner said he was doing his job properly and the hard ground was the cause 
of the accident. He said that an improved mine detector would help prevent such accidents in 
future. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the accident was caused by "negligence of the demining 
procedures" because the barbed wire should have been cut and removed. Also that the 
command group showed poor performance and should have prevented the victim ignoring 
proper marking and prodding procedures. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that it should be stressed that all teams' command groups 
have close supervision of their deminers; that no one should be allowed to prod without 
placing markers properly; that obstacles in the demining lane should be removed, especially 
when those obstacles interfere with the detecting process; and that the command group 
should be disciplined for poor control. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 126 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: no 
Compensation: 500,000 Rs (100%) Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: Helmet, Thin, short 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
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INJURIES 
minor Chest 
minor Face 
minor Legs 
severe Arm 
severe Hand 
severe Hearing 
severe Shoulder 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Finger  
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The victim's injuries were summarised as: fractured fingers on right hand, fragments on right 
arm, legs, chin, left hand and chest.  
A medic’s sketch (reproduced below) showed multiple fragments and abrasions to his chest 
and right arm, right thigh and left shin and a fractured ankle.  
 
 
The demining group submitted a compensation claim on 22nd September 1997 but it was lost 
by the insurers. It listed his injuries as: loss of hearing both ears, amputation right index 
finger, stiffness of fingers of right hand. The claim was resubmitted listing the injuries as: loss 
of hearing in both ears, multiple injuries to right hand, right shoulder and both legs.  
Compensation of 500,000 Rs was forwarded on 4th December 1997. 
3 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
was working around an obstacle that the field supervisors should have arranged to be 
removed.  
The inadequacy of the detector and of the short handtool provided may represent serious 
failings higher in the management chain.  
The appropriate tools for "wire-pulling" may not have been available - see the accidents in 
Afghanistan on 13th January 1997 and 29th April 1997 in which problems with barbed wire 
removal also arose. 
The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment”. 
The use of a squatting position to "excavate" was in breach of UN requirements, but not in 
breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those requirements.  The failure of 
the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt the SOP for local conditions, or 
enforce their own standards may be seen as a management failing. 
The victim's severe deafness is common among Afghan claims at this time, when insurance 
favoured such injury and testing the validity of claims was difficult. 
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
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